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INTRODUCTION:- On account of the constanu Lendency of
real estate toward aggcegaion, which tendency is being continually accelerated from the possibility of the aggregators
being able uo control the channels of trade and the markeu
value of products b- controlling the greatest -mout of the
goods which passed through those channels to that market,
there is, as there ever has been, a gradual incorporation of
small farms into the estates of larger land owners. As a
further reason for this assimilation of small farms by the
larger ones, it is an historical fact, persisting through the
ages, that the unskillful mass wi1l be ruled by the skillful
few. Therefore, legislatures have been swayed by the well
directed and concentrayed power of

privileged

classes at the

expense or in disregard of the less favored. In the primitive
social orgranizations, the warrior was the dominant and,
therefore, the privileged party, while the tiller of the soil
was his servant; and not till the barons, with reverent search
united their forces to preserve their rights, did the law-making power regard with favor the masses who obeyed those laws.
Thus it has come to pass in England that% the

few land

(2

)

directors or landlords have survived the inroads into legislative favor of mighty corporation and other association.
Hence it is today that we find"'the whole of England,
Ireland and Scotland held under deeds to a few landlords;

and

here in our free America, the boundaries of the larger farms
are constantly lengthening. This is due partly to the cause
that legislation, so far as it affects the farmer is made
with little reference to his needs.

But it is chiefly due

to the cause of the last named cause, viz:- the inability of
the great number of our farmers to combine to demand a due
appreciation of their wants at the hands of the legislatures,
together with the impossibility of their ruling their own
markets by direct communication with them,-

thereby obliter-

ating that vast army of middle men or agents.
The important conclusion from the foregoing is that the
by reason of the increasing aggregation of land under the
ownership of a few which fact necessitates and ever increasing
number of tenants to work the land of the large landowners,
the law of Tenancies for Years embodies principles of ever
widaning interest and importance.

( 3 )

HISTORY, NATURE & DISTINCTION OF ESTATES FOR YEARS:

In the early common law and until the reign of Henry III.
uhere were none but freehold estates in lands. While this
state of things existed or rather as long as the Feudal system
obtained, all tenants except of freehold held land at the
will of the landlord and no estate in the lands which they
could enforce in law. Such tenants held simply as the landlords
servants who for use of lands were to render some service
to the landlord, and in case of being wrongfully dispossessed,
could only sue for damages. But in Henry III. reign the writ
of "Qtiare Ejectic infra terminum" was framed by which the
termor could recover possession of the land as against any
one except a stranger who entered and tortiously ousted the
ternor in which case the termor could only sue in the name of
lessor.
Finally in Edward III.

reign,

the writ of ejectment,

substantially like the writ now in use, was invented and so
shaped as to enable the

tenant of a term to recover it when

deprived of the possession of the leased premises. From this
time the security of possession of the land was vouchsafed

(4)

to tenants for years to the same extent as life tenants
and the same remedies obtained.
An estate for years is onec that is created by a contract called a lease, whereby one man called the lessor, lets
to another, called the lessee, the possession of lands or
tenemants for a term of time fixed and agreed upon by the
parties to the same/ 1.

Wash. 291. And it matters not that

the term is for less than a year provided the time of its
existence is of definite extent. 1b. By a tenanc

for years

is meant more than a mere grant of a certain interest in land,such as a portion of the crops or other products,- there is
intended in a tenancy for years :-a contract, more or less explicit as to the teins and conditions of the enjoyment of a
term by the Tenanu and vhe

ime for which -ha- enjoymen,# is

to endure. Subject to the agreement in the lease, the use and
products of the premises are the lessee's as owner. Thus
a tenant, whether for life or years, may work ank.open mine on
the premises, or a quarry, and the products cf the mine or
quarry are a part of the profits of the estate to which the
tenant is entitled, Freer v. Stotenbur, 36 Barb. 641 .
This principle is based on the evident intent of the par-

( 5 )

ties in the contract viz: That the contract has for its foundation or consideration the profits which may be realized from
the use to which the property has been subjected and for
which it is thereby represented to be valuable. So the tenant
may attach fixtures, such as treesz and nursery stock, buildings, andremove them before giving up possession at the end of
the term. Rutter v. Smith, 2 Wall. 491-7. It seems that he
may exercise this right until he yields possession, although
the term may have expired.

But this

is

an exception to the

general rule by which the tenant forfeits these fixtures if
he does not remove them during the term, being thereafter
a part of the premises, his ownershil, ceases as to LiI rights.
I. Wash. 291. And if by superior title

in some person other

than the lessor or by other means, the lessee's estate is determined not by his fault,

he will have the privilege of

removing the fixtures in a reasonable time. I. Wash. 292.
Though usual the reservation of rent is not essential to
the validity of a tenancy for years by lease. Failing v.Schenk,
3 Hill 344;

State v. Page, 1 Speers 408.

The word term signifies an estate for years, from the

( 6 )

Latin terminus, because the estate has a definite period to
endure which is between a fixed

beginning and ending. 1 Wash.

292.
An inueresse termini is ihe interest which The turmor has
prior to actual occupancy and after the delivery of the contract or lease. A lease does not take effect until delivery.
It is unimportant when the lease was written.
What Constitutes Delivery of' a Lease:
ln Fisher v. Hall 41 I,. Y. 416 ( 422 ) the doctrine is
thlis sunried up by Judge Daniels: To constitite a complete
delivery of a deed, the grantor must do some act putting it
beyond his power to revoke. The delivery need not be

to the

grantee, but may be to another person, by sufficient authority
from the grantee; or it may be to a stranger for and in behalf
and to the use of the party witho t authority. ( Church vJ
Gilman 15 Wend. 660 ).
The grantee is presumed to have accepted. To constitute
a delivery of a deed which will be effectual in transferring
title, the grantor must part with the possession of the deed
or the right to retain it by unequivocal declarations that he

(7 )

holds as bailee for the grantee, that is with the consent of
the grantee who left with the grantor. (Farrar v. Bridges
5 Hump.

( Tenn. ) 44). In Ruskin v) Shield 11 Ga. 636 it was

held thatthe attestation clause reciting that the deed was
delivered was not of itself sufficient to establish a delivery; and the same courts held in Rutledge v. Montgomery 30
Ga. 641, that there was no delivery of a deed which the grantw
concealed from the grantee, and held not in subordination to
him, but independent of his will and with the intention that
Ik* should not go into his custody. The same was held in the
above N. Y.case.
A lease to A. for one year with a privilege of holding
for three years is a lease for years either for one year or
three years as lessee shall elect. 1 Wash. 294. And a lease
for one year and so on from year to year, is regarded as one
for

two years certain and is an estate for years. Denn v.

C: rtright, 4 East, 29. Also an estate for years results
where a person leases land till a certain debt is paid. 1 Wash
295; Homer vJ Leeds 25 N. J. 106.
Ths is on the ground that waht may be made certain is

(8
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certain as to the duration of a term. And, in the last above
supposed case, it was claimed by estimation that the lessee
could determine the lenAth of time during which he must
occupy the premises for the payment of the debt.
A termor with simply Interesse termini can maintain an
action of ejectment when the time comes for actual possession
by him under the lease but until actual occupancy or entry
he cannot maintain an action for trespass. 1 Wash. 297.
In delivering possession, the lessor simply warrants
his own right so to do as against paramount title and does
not vouchsafe any posssession as against strangers. Field v)
Herrick 101 Ill.

210; Trull v) Granger 8 N. Y. 115. Nob

does it matter if the lessee neglects to enter as to his liability for rent provided it is not the lessor's fault on on
account of paramount title. 1 Wash. 297.

CREATION OF ESTATES FOR

YEARS:

At common law estates for years could be created in
three ways,- by deed, b7 writing not under seal, and by
parole; but if an incorporeal hereditiment, it must be created
by deed. Wms. Real Prop. 195 & 327. By the Statute of Frauds
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which has been adopted by nearly all the States, all leases
for more than three years ( one year in New York State

) not

put in writing and signed by the party charged shall have the
force and effect of estates at will only. And in N. Y. leases
for three years o:

more must be recorded in order to avil

the lessee as against subsequent bona fide encumbrancers for
value. As to leases for lo9,r than one year the statutes of
the several state differ as to whether such leases shall be
under seal. One of the most difficult questions relatin* to
leases is as to whether it is intended that they begin at
present or in the future. To answer this, the

intention of the

parties, as gather from the whole instrument, cont-rols.

If

iimediate possession follows with consent of lessor, the
lease will be construed as a present ddmise, though the

"lease to cornence in future" be inserted into the lease.
Whiting v. Allaire 1 N. Y., 305- 11; Holley v. Young M6 lie.
520; Dussman v. Ganster 72 Pa. Bt. 285. To tell whether the
instrument is a lease or an agreement for a lease, it is usualy sufficient to decide if

there is

anytIhing left incomplete

by the parties. If not, it may operate as a present demise.

( 10 )

CONDITIONS IN LEASES:
By a condition in a lease is meant a clause of

contin-

gency on the happening of which the estate granted may be
defeated. 2,Bl. Comm. '399. It is a general rule that, when by
licens

a lessor permits a termor to break the condition in

a certain particular, the condition stands as to all the
other bonds of the condition and works a waiver

by the les-

sor only of that particular object of the license. FoCExample
where lessee has made a breech of condition not to sublet,
and the lessor receives rent from such sub-lessee, ther lessor
has waived his right to avoid the lease,- but if the lessee
should sublet agin the lessor could restrain the lessee from
the future enjoyment of his lease. Ireland v. N-chols 46 N. Y
-_13. BLtt no breach of condition not to alien will result from
decree of bankruptcy or surrender by eminent domain unless
such cases be specifically stated in the condition. Jackson
v. Corliss 7 Johns. 531; Smith v. Putnam 3 Pick. 221. Of
course the death of the lessee does hot break the condition
against alienation or assignment because the executor or administ.ato, is the deceased personal represena.ive, and can

(11

alienate

,he uem

)

nless specifically

xesu.icued b, The lease.

General zerms agains, alienauion will not avail againsu alienation by the lessee's personal represenatives,- the necessity arising from the Act of God. Seers v. Hind 1 Yes. Jr. 295;
Bemis v. Wilder 100 Mass. 446.
In Bemis v. Wilder above where lessee held against assignee in bankruptcy depending for his right upon a covenant in
his lease on his part not to sublet not to prevent or suffer
any other person or persons to occupy or improve the premises
except with the consent of the lessor. Held, that although
lessee could not take advantage of a condition broken by himself in this case, moreover Judge Colt held,- it is well settled that an assignment by operation of law passes the estate
discharged of the covenant to the assignee and this would
seem to be so where the transfer arises from volutary proceed#
ings in insolvency, as distinguished from proceedings

in

invitum provided no fraud enters the transaction.
Nor is it a breach of condition against alienation if
a partner, who goes out of the partnership and another comes
in and takes his place as copartner, the partners being the

(12
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lessees. Roosevelt v) Hopkins 33 N. Y. 81.
Courts construe conditions, which work forfeitures,
strictly.Thus a condition against subletting does not cover
an assignment of a term and in such cases an assignment will
not work a forfeiture. Lynde v. Hough 27 Barb. 415; Field v.
1Mills 23 N. J., 254. And so is an underletting not a breach
of a condition against assigning the term. 33 N. Y. 81 Supra.
1 Wash. 317. And since conditions in leases are for the
sole benefit of a lessor, his assignee cannot take advantage of any breach before assignment to himself. Where one
makes a lease with a conditional limitation viz,- lease
absolute for three years and for two years thereafter if he
the lessor did not sell the property ; held, that a sale
at any time during the last two years would avoid the lease.
Knowles v4 Hull 97 Mass.

206; Morton V. Weir 70 N. Y. 247.

COVENANTS IN LEASES:
Covenants are

either,

1. Implied as of law, or,
2. Expreeso of as Deeds.
A covenant for quiet enjoyment is implied in a lease.

(13

Mayor of N. Y. v. Mabie 13 N. Y.,

150. That is as against

superior title, but not as against strangers or trespassers.
But the lessee cannot claim pay for voluntary repairs of the
promises. 1 Wash. 326. If lessor does not fulfill his agreement to make repairs, the lesseee

is not justified in aban-

doning the premises, but his action would be one on covenant
or agreement. Tibbetts v. Percy 24 Barb. 39; 1 E. D. Smith
253.
But such a breach of contract would be a good counter
claim in an action by the lessor for rent. Kelsey vJ Ward 38
N. Y. 83.
On the part of the lessee,

if no covenant is expressed in

the lease the rent is implied to be paid at the end of the
unit of the term. Ridgley v. Stillwell 27 Mo. 128. The tenant
Is bound to keep buildings in repair to preserve timber, to
keep the soil in a proper state of cultivation, and a failure
to do this renders him liable to an action for waste. 1 Wash.

326 #3.
The tenant cannot get title by buying the tax title to
the land of which he is tenant. Prettyman v) Walston 34 I1,
191-2. As a general proposition, an assignee is only liable
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for a breach of covenant which occur- while he remains possessed of the estate. Thus, if a lessee assign his term to
A. who holds the premises for a while and then assigns to B.
who holds them when the rent falls due, the lessor may sue
the lessee upon his personal uovenant to pay the rent. Or he
may sue B. and recover by reason of the privity of estate
between them. But he could not hold A. liable for any part
of the rent by reason of his having held the premises as
assignee for a part of the time. 1 Wash. 326; Taylor Landlord
& Tenant #449;

Graves v. Porter 11 Barb. 592. In the last

cited case it is decided that when a person takes premises
as assignee of a term between rent days he takes it "cm onere-,
subject to the payment of the rent which shall thereafter
fall due. That is, when a person is assigned all the title,
interest and right in a leasehe takes it as it stands,with its present liabilities. If rent is to be paid at a
future date as by covenant in the lease, although a part of
the time for which that rent is payable has passed at the time
the assignee takexpessession, still he is bound on his implied
covenant with the assignor to pay rent for that past portion
of the term.

(15
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V,here the lessee 'i*s, by the te Tn of his lease, at liberty to purchase
the

term,

it

the estate

was held

,-

at a certain price at the end of
the assignment of his lease gave his

assignee the right to claim the conveyance. Napier v. Darling
70 Pa. St.

07; Kerr v. Day 14 Pa. St.

ling Supra.,

112.

In

Napier v. Dar-

it was held that the agreement giving the option

-o purchase was not a mere personal covenant, but a right
which, though resting solely with the lessee, might be transferred to his vendee

( assignee

), and enforced, at his

election, with the same effect as if the contract had been
absolute in its terms. Such a stipulation is in the nature
of a continuing offer to sell.
Such a covenant is said to run with the land. And in
general all covenants run with

the land which are for the ben-

efit of a lessorls estate, because it is presuned that he
would not have made the lease except
formed a part of the consideration

that those covenants

therfor.

And because the

lessee has the right to transfer or assign his interest
in the term, if not expressly restricted, he has the right of
assigning all his privlegss under suc~lease. But, of course,
since the lessor has this election to hold the lessee or
ip

2rnfler

foP

the

(

f-

l

--

P
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and express conditions, he has his election as to which he
will look to for payment inthe case above supposed where a
privilege of purchase was given to the lessee. Van Rensalear
v. Smith 27 Barb. 146-7. But if the covenant is to do something not beneficial to the estate or which is for the benefit of the lessor alone, that covenant would not run with the
land. I 1 Wash* 330. But he reamins liable on his express
covenants even though the lessor assent in writing to the
assignment, and though he has actually received rent of the
assignee. Bailey v. Wells, 8 Wis. 141; Port v. Jackson 17
Johns 239; Quackenbos v. Clarke 12 Wend. 556. In Bailey v.
Wells Supra. the court held the above from the express provisions of the Statute of Frauds which declares that no assignment
of a lease will be good unless in writing and signed by the
party chuged. Thefore no surrender to the lessor had been
effected. In Port v. Jackson Supra, they

court relies for

their decision in a similar case upon an entirely different
ground, viz,-

the nature of the agreement between lessor and

lessee/ This is a case where the lessor had received rent
from the assignee of his lessee. In the course of the: opinion

(17
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the courts say, - The lessee continuing to be liable, he
selects his successor, with a view to the future punctual
payment of the rent, and trusting to t1e

repponsibility of

the person to whom he sells, he takes from him such security,
by way of covenant, or otherwise, as shall bind him to pay the
rent, notwithstanding any future alienation that may be made
of the land. And from the above cited cases it seems that if
the lessor accepts rent from his lessee's assignee, he does
not thereby accept a surrender on the part of the lessee, but
still holds the lessee as

guarantor

,howhe may look to for

any of the unpaid rent.
If buildings are destroyed without the fault of lessor
or lessee neither will be obliged to rebuild in the absence
of express covenant in the lease to repair or otherwise to
the contrary.

Post V.

Vetter 2 E..D.

Smith 248; Wells v.

Castles 3 Gray 323.

ASSIGNMENT AND SUB-TENANCY:

Unless restrained by lease, a lessee may assign or sublet his leasehold interest. Taylor L. & T. 22. And, if the

( 18

)

lease is under seal, the assignment must be under seal.
Bridgham v. Tileston 5 Allen 371.
A letting by lessee of a portion of leased premises for
the whole term is an assignment of such portion and not &n
underletting; and, as an assignment, the assignee becomes
liable for all the covenants, pro tanto, to the lessor, 1 Wash
334. And this would be so even though the premises were let
for more than what lessee paid for them. Otherwise where first
lessee reserves any of the powers incident to the lessor.For
example, such as entry etc. Collins v. Hasbrouck 56

N. Y.

157. Unless a tenant of a lessee can be charged as assignee,
he is a subtenant and is liable neither in equity or law to
the lessor. Bedford v. Terhune 30 N. Y., 458; Davis v.
Morris 36 N. Y.,

574. The reason for this is that, in cases

of assiginment, no reversion remains in the assignor.
A tenant for years, unless restrained by the covenants
and conditions of his lease, may under let the premises or
any part of them or carve up his estate into such forms as
he sees fit, and, during the continuance of the term, the
original lessor is so far divested of the possession, that,
if he were to find the premises vanant, he would have no
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more right to enter upon them than a stranger. Brown v.
Powell 25 Pa. St. 229; Wms. Real Prop. 335-6. The assignee
or grantee of the lessor is entitled to rent from last pay-day.
Stillwell v. Doughty 3 Brdf. 359. As to the liability of
the mortgagee of a term, the better opinion is that such
mortgageee becomes responsible as assignee when hetake5possession under his deed, but not before. Felch v. Taylor 13
Pick. 133; Walton v. Cronly 14 Wend. 13; Astor v. Miller 2
Paige 68. This is so because the mortgagee has simply a chatt&L
interest in the estate. In cases of general assignments of
debtor for benefit of his creditors, such assignee of debtors
lease will not be charged as assignee till he elects to take
the lease after a reasonable time to see if by so doing the
lease will be to the advantage of creditors. Journey v. Brackley 1 Hilton 447.
OF RENT,

EVICTION,

DESTRUCTION AND USE OF PREMISES:

No claim against the lessee of his assignee for rent
until they have enjoyed the premises during the whole time
for which the payment of a rent is stipulated to be made,
unless the rent is payable in advance. Boardman v) Osborn 23
Pick. 295. And where no time is fixed for such payment to be
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made, it is not due till the end of the year, or the rent
period. Ridgley v. Stillwell 27 Mo. 128.

It has been held

that where the lessor was given power to determine the lease
by selling the estate at any time and he sold it between the
times of payment of rent, he could not recover rent for
the time dfring which the lessee had occupied the premises
after the last preceeding rent day.

icholson v. Munigle 6

Allen 215; Zuie v. Zule 24 Wend. 76. The same doctrine applies
wherethe demise was by parole. 6 Allen 219,

n.

The principle upon ,hich these cases were decided seems
to be
ment
done,

the power of the lessor to destroy the tenant's enjoyof the estate at the former's option; and if this be
the lessor must suffer the incoveniences which his own

will has occasioned tather than making the passive lessee
suffer them. The same principole applies where the tenant is
evicted by paramount title between rent days. If a tenant is
evicted by the public enemy or by the public armed force the
tenant will still at common law be held for the rent. Shilling
v. Holme 23 Cal. 227; Opposite held in Bailey v. Lawrence 1
Bay 499.
But if landlord worngfully evicts a tenant for years
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from a portion of the premises, the tenant will not be bound
to pay any rent. 1 Wash. 343. So where the second lessee of
lessor evicts the first lessee,- the act being so far the
act of the lessor that it operates as such. Wright v. Lattin
38 Ill. 293. As to damages see Larkin v. Misland 100 N. Y.
212. The exemption fram payment of rent dates from the last
rent day. Chatterton v. Fox 5 Duer 64. The use by the lessor
of a part of the rented house for immoral purposes will be a
substantial eviction. Dyett v. Pendleton 8 Cowen 727. Where
there is constrjctive eviction as above, the tenant must
quit the premises in order to be relieved from paying rent.
See above citations.
293. The rule is,-

Also Bareel v. Lawton 90 N. Y

any obstruction by the landlord to the ben-

eficial enjoyment of the demised premises, or a diminution of
the concideration of the contract by the acts of the landlord,
amounts to a constructive eviction. Lewis v. Payn 4 Wend . 423
rTere trespass of a lessor does not amount to an eviction. An
entry by the lessor for the purpose of making repairs or
for lessee's benefit would not work an eviction. Peterson v.
Edmonson 5 Harrington 378. If the entire premises are destroyed without lessor's fault, the lessee will be liable at common

( 22 )

law for rent unless otherwise stipulated.
This is

decided

in

Drer v.

Wightman 66 Pa.

St.

425

where a tenant was evicted by the exercise of the right of
eminent domain upon the ground that the tenant's right to damages is to be enforced by the tenant proving such right and
the extent thereof before the jury appointed to assess damages. A lessee of buildings which are burned has no relief
at law or in eqmity against an express covenant to pay the
rent unless he has protected himself by a stipulation in the
lease or the landlord has covenanted to rebuild. 3 Kent 466.
Though the rule is not equitable it is well settled.
Gates v. Green 4 Paige 355. Changed by a statute in N. Y.
laws of 1860, Chap. 345. The above naned cases proceed upon
the principle that the loss id the lessee's to the extent of
his covenant to pay rent, repair,

or restore and not the

lessor's because the lessee is the purchaser and owner of the
premises to the extent of supporting his covenants, and he
takes his own chances. If the tenan. covenants to repair, he
must rebuild if the premises are burned down. 1 .'ash. 348.
And it is immaterial as to the lessee that

the lessor

lias the property insured. Bellfour v. Weston 1 T. R. 310.

(23
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Opinion per Lord Mansfield .
The tenant has no right in equity to demand that the insurance money be applied in rebuilding the premises nor to
restrain the lessor from suing for the rent until the structure is restored. Sheets v. Seldon 7 Wall. 416-24; Moffat v.
Smith 4 N. Y.,
It

is

126.

a genegv

rule gatherdfrom

the cases

that where a

person leases a privilege, he is not bound to repair the premises or to keep irnrepair premises upon the condition of whichk
the value of the leased premises depends.Eg. Water privilege
from a canal, destruction of leased premise from fire. Doupe
v.

Genin 45 N.

Y.

121-3.

But where one leases one of many

rooms in a house and the house burns down the lessee is
at

not liable
26 N. Y.,

common law for further rent.

Graves v.

Berdan

498.

In Grave v. Berdan Supra the court recsoned,- Where
the lessee takes an interest in the soil upon
stands,

if

the building is

destroyed by fire,

which a buildig
he may use the

land upon which the building stood, beneficially, to some
extent,

without the building,

or he malr rebuild the edifice;

but where he takes no interest in the soil, as in the case of
a basement, or of upper rooms in the building he cannot

ZL

e:-,

oy t]he -p;e iisos in

building,

an7 -ianner after the destruction of a

nor can he rebuild;

and there s-hould be an abate-

ment or apportiojmvent of the rent.

OF SUY-L-$I.TLR I" RGER ET,.

A surrender can be inade only by Ceed unless tin:e is

25 Pa.

"iller

St.

-ade.

,rould be r;ood if

as short as parole lease

Kiester v.

481.

Any acts which are equivalent to an agreement on the part
of a tenant to abandon,

and on the part of the landlor-

Talbot v.

der of the term by oper'ation of law.
Allen 177-80.

to a surrm-

&ount

res'm-e possession of the demised praises,

to

Whinnle 14

The surrender to be of any effect ih

barring

a claim for rent, imist be with the assent of the lessor.
Stobie v.

351; llanh a a
in

_nd must be followed blT acts of

on part of both parties. Amory v.

surrender
MIass.

32.

Dills 62 Ii.

M~organ

y.

v.

19.

3S'erman 114 Mlass.

Siith 17 N.

Y. ,

537

Kannoffsky 117

L.

lessor ageed uith his

lessees to rent the premises fo" lessees at their risk.
Afterviarr's t' e lessee delivered the key to lessor
that there Avas no surrender,
,-,--

to

..

-t '

. Held,

but siinly an act to make it
oit

i

'ee-eit

to rent th,e
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)

the premises.
In Thomas v. Nesok 69 N. Y.,

118, the court held that

mere retention by the lessor of keys delivered to him by the
lessee without lessor's request or assent,- as where keys
were sent through the mail,- does not of itself

amount to a

surrender and acceptance. Also held, that the lessor was not
bound to seek the tenant and tender to him the return of the
keys. In this case the tenant had moved away from the premises
before he sent the keys to lessor.
In Craske v. Christian Union Pub. Co. 17 Hun 316- 9,
where the keys were sent to lessor by lessee with a message
that the premises were surrendered; and he replies by saying
that they are received and intimates that if the tenant desires he will make an effort to rent them, several articles
of the tenant also being left on the premises,- held not a
surrender because the landlord's intimation clearly excludes
the idea of acceptance. For a constructive surrender there
must be an acceptance by the landlord
Judge Park in Lyon v.

Reed 13 11.

W. 306,

thus sums up

the law of surrender by operation of law: This term is appled
in cases where an owner of a particular estate has been a

(26

)

party to some act, the validity of which he is, by law,
afterwards estopped from disputing, and which would not be
valid if his particular estate had continued to exist. There
the law treats the doing of such act as amounting to surrender. In such case, it will be observed, there can be no
question of intention. The surrender is not the result of intention. It takes place independently, and even in spite of
intention. As to merger, if the intermediate term is greater
than the reversion term and there is a surrender of the intermediate term the reversioner holds only for his own smaller
term. 1 Wash. 355. Therefore, there is a merger of the larger
into the

smaller estate.

There is

no merger where there

is

a

remainder instead of a reversion.

LETTING LANDS UPON SHAPS:

If the agreement amounts only to the effect that one
who

is to do the labor shal1 take charge of and manage the

land in consideratioh of receiving the value of a fractional
part of all the grain it is not regarded as a lease, but more
in the nature of a paymient for services rendered by a part

(2't

)

of the crops raised; and as a result the title to the whole
crop remains in
N. Y.,

the owner of the land.

Tanner v.

Hills 48

u62; Steele V. Frick 56 Pa. St. 172.

But if the agreement be for a division of the specific
crops,

the owner oftland

and the occupant,

in

the above

supposed case, are to be regarded as tenants in common of these
crops. Putnam v. Wise 1 Hill 234; Chandler v. Thurston 10
Pick. 205; Dinehart v. Wilson 15 Barb. 595; Atwood v. Ruchrnan
21 Ill. 200. Also Tanner v. Hill$44 Barb. 428 and Lewis v.
Lyman 22 Pick.

437.

On account of the powers and liabilities which differ
so widely according as they are exercised or borne by tenants
partners,

or mere servants;

it is of much importance to

gain a clear appreciation of what characterizes lessees,
tenants in coniynon, and partners.
Landlords and those who hold under o"- with them are
the profits
partners only when they are to share mutually
234. And it will
and losses. Putnam el. al. v. Wise 1 Hill
occupier
not constitute a partnership if they agree that the
shall work the premises and divide the gross earnings.
Ambler v. Bradley 6 Ver. Rep. 119.

(28

)

The Court holding that,- They never

shared in profit and

loss.The share which the occupier received was a mere compensation for his labor.

This agreement constituted the

landlord and occupier master and servant. And it is the
rule that whenvver the occupier is to be renuxnerated for his
labor wvith money,- whether Ve amount thereof is to be determined only after the crop has been sold, as by what a
fraction of it will bring, or by an amount of money determined

ab inito,- the relation thus established is that of

mastcr and servant. ( Vid. 48 N. Y. 662 Supra.). But if the
owner and occupier agree that there shall

be a division of

the crops or products themselves and that a part thereof
shall go th the occupier and the rest to the owner, the
relation of tenants in common is thereby created, and, as
the result, the tenant cam convey only his interest in such
products. Putnam v. Wise Supra. And they are tenants in
common though the owner delivers entire possession in fact.
The last propositions are true even though the technical
word " Lease" and"to

farmlet" be used in the contract.

But in Taylor v. Bradley 4 Abb. N. Y.,

Court of

Appeals

Dec. per Judge Woodruff, the reasoning of the above proposi-

(29

tion,

)

viz: That the owner would be a tenant in

common even if

he did not remain ih possession or supervise a part of the
operations,-

is strongly question-aand adjudged wrong on prin-

ciple, but the court does not overrule the case in 1 Hill
Supra. Yet the court reasons-,

If the question were new, I

should say unhesitatingly that each case ought to be

chiefly

govergned by the langauage employed by the parties to express
their intention. Nor do I

perceive any legal objection to

a stipulation for the payment of rent in wheat or products
of the land leased. ''' Thus if ""should
and let the farm to B.,
x

demise, lease,

to have and to hold for the term of

years rendering to A. and annual rent for the use of the

farm, to wit: One half of the crops raised,- I perceive no
sensible reasonwhY the parties should not be deemed to intend
an actual and technical lease which would entitle the lessee
to possession, give him a term in the land, make his payment
rent in the technical sense. But the court holds that in case
there .:as an intention that the tenant shold hold entire possession,- then a technical lease would not result.
If, however, the occupier agree to render x bushels of
grain to be raised on the farm, the relation of lessor and

( 30 )

lessee would result.
Putnam v. Wise Supra. And as to distinguishing between tenants
in

common and lessees,

it

the term be for a crop or for a year.

is

immaterial whether

lb.

In the course of this brief investigation,I have endeavored to elucidate only some of the most perplexing problems
which are of greatest prlactical importance in determining the
rights of lessors and lessees. And in this endeavor I have
constantly sought underlying principles instead of outlined
anomalies.

